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ABSTRACT
The Internet inter-domain routing protocol, BGP, experiences
frequent routing disruptions such as transient routing loops
or loss of connectivity. The goal of this paper is to address
this issue while preserving BGP’s benefits in terms of op-
erational maturity and flexibility in accommodating diverse
policies. In realizing this goal, we apply to inter-domain
routing a common concept in the design of highly reliable
systems, namely, the use of redundancy, which we introduce
in a manner that maximizes compatibility with the existing
BGP protocol. The basic idea is to run several, mostly un-
changed BGP processes that compute complementary routes,
so that in the presence of network instabilities a working path
remains available to any destination. The paper outlines the
design of this approach and compares it to previously pro-
posed alternatives. The benefits of the scheme are demon-
strated using actual BGP data and realistic simulations.
1. INTRODUCTION
With our growing reliance on the Internet, its reliabil-
ity, in particular that of its routing system, has become
ever more important. Fulfilling this need has, how-
ever, proven challenging, because the distributed na-
ture of Internet routing decisions introduces unavoid-
able latency in reacting to network changes. This is
particularly evident in inter-domain routing, where the
shortcomings of the de facto standard routing protocol,
BGP, are well known [10]. For instance, BGP may take
as long as 30 minutes to converge after certain routing
events [13], during which transient routing loops and
failures frequently occur. Recent measurement stud-
ies [9,18] have shown that 55%∼85% of short-lived rout-
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ing failures occur during BGP convergence, and that
transient loops account for up to 90% of packet losses.
There have been numerous proposals to address this
challenge. One approach is to speed-up BGP conver-
gence; hence limiting the duration and thereby impact
of transient routing loops and failures [1,3,15,17]. This
can in part be realized by including root cause infor-
mation (RCI) in routing updates, so as to speed up the
removal of obsolete routes affected by a common fail-
ure. Another approach is to compute backup paths that
can supplement the “best path” selected by BGP. The
R-BGP protocol [11] is one such solution, but it also
requires additional information in the form of RCI to
compute good backup paths. Such solutions, therefore,
introduce substantial overhead as well as modification
to the operations or behavior of BGP which can affect
the odds of successful deployment.
This paper shares the goal of those earlier proposals,
i.e., improving the reliability of inter-domain routing,
but it seeks to realize it while preserving the wealth of
operational knowledge and expertise embedded in BGP.
This rules out approaches that call for adding complex
new information to BGP or significant modification of
its behavior/operations (e.g., as embodied in RCI). The
basic idea behind our approach is to use multiple (two)
slightly extended BGP processes instead of one with ex-
tensive modifications. The two BGP processes operate
and select paths nearly as standard BGP process, but
exploit the AS-level path diversity of the Internet to
compute complementary paths, i.e., paths that are not
affected by the same sets of events.
Although this sounds straightforward, computing dis-
joint policy compliant paths, a key requirement for inter-
domain routing, is notoriously hard [4], and even more
so if it is to be accomplished under the constraint of
minimal changes to BGP. In tackling this problem, we
first identify possible simplifications brought about by
the Internet structure and common routing policies. In
particular, we establish that complementary routing so-
lutions can be obtained by focusing only on the “down-
hill” portion of paths, i.e., the segments that extend
from provider ASes to customer ASes towards the desti-
nation, if each AS is modeled as one node in AS graph.
Once complementary routes are available, it remains
to specify how to use them, and in particular identify
which one is free of problems and should be used at
any one time. We propose a simple approach to this
problem and argue its effectiveness.
The bulk of the paper is devoted to describing the
proposed scheme, articulating how it meets our original
goals, i.e., improving BGP’s reliability without signifi-
cantly affecting its current operational characteristics.
and comparing its efficacy to that of earlier proposals.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
background information on inter-domain routing. Sec-
tion 3 discusses the basic design principles behind our
multi-process routing scheme. Details on its design and
realization are given in Sections 4 and 5. Section 6 is
devoted to an extensive evaluation of the scheme and
its performance. Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. BACKGROUND
In this section, we first review Internet routing and
transient BGP problems, and then introduce our clas-
sification of routing events used throughout this paper.
2.1 BGP and Transient Routing Problems
BGP is a policy-based path vector protocol which
has been shown to converge under specific policy con-
straints [8]. In practice, neighboring ASes commonly
engage in bilateral agreements, also called AS relation-
ships, which determine and constrain their routing poli-
cies. The two most common are customer-provider re-
lationship and peer-peer relationship [5]. Because of
the economic interests associated with these relation-
ships, ASes typically follow two common routing poli-
cies, prefer-customer - whenever they are available, -an
AS always selects customer routes (routes learned from
a customer), and valley-free –an AS does not advertise
provider/peer routes (learned from a provider/peer) to
other providers/peers. Assuming that the customer-
provider relationships between ASes are acyclic1, which
holds in practice, the BGP protocol has been shown to
besafe, i.e., it always converges to a stable set of routes
if every AS adopts these two policies [6]. This paper
assumes that those conditions are satisfied.
The safeness of BGP not withstanding, it only implies
that routing “eventually” converges. However, while
converging, ASes can experience transient loss of reach-
ability, commonly referred to as transient routing fail-
ures [18]. Moreover, inconsistency in routing informa-
tion across ASes during convergence can also result in
transient routing loops. Eliminating such incidents, to
the extent possible, is one of the goals of this paper.
1Namely, the provider of any AS cannot be a customer of
that AS’ customers, or a customer of a customer, and so on.
2.2 Routing Events
A first step in realizing this goal is to characterize
the set of events that trigger BGP changes. Example
of such “routing events” include link failure/recovery,
BGP session reset, router crash/recovery, policy changes,
etc. We group routing events into three classes: a route
withdrawal event is an event that triggers one or more
ASes to withdraw, explicitly or implicitly, (in case of
failure), withdraw one or more routes; a route addi-
tion event is an event that triggers one or more ASes
to announce a new route; and a route change event is
an event that triggers an AS to announce route up-
dates. Failure or policy changes are common causes for
the first and third types of events, while recoveries and
possibly policy changes are usually behind the second
type of events. Our focus is on improving the resiliency
of inter-domain routing against disruptions associated
with a single routing event, i.e., eliminate or minimize
associated packet forwarding disruptions.
3. MULTIPLE ROUTING PROCESSES
3.1 Basic Idea
We seek to provide robustness against single routing
events, by providing each AS with two distinct sets of
routes that are complementary. This is realized by hav-
ing two slightly modified BGP routing processes run-
ning in each AS, i.e., a red process and a blue process.
The red and blue paths they compute seek to satisfy a
key property, namely, node disjointness, i.e., not share
AS nodes except for the source and destination (recall
that our focus is on AS-level paths, with each AS a
“node” in the path). This ensures that they are not
affected by the same sets of events.
Each routing process is basically a slightly modified
BGP process that relies on the standard BGP path se-
lection process. BGP messages are unchanged, except
for the addition of two new path attributes. One is to
assist in coordinating the red and blue processes in an
AS2; the other is used to determine which process has
stable paths in the presence of routing events.
Differentiating the red and blue routing processes can
be realized, for example, through distinct TCP ports.
Alternatively, a single process handling two routing in-
stances can be used. Both are semantically identical,
and the use of the term “process” is meant primarily as
an abstraction helpful in describing the solution.
3.2 Downhill Node Disjointness
Having stated our primary goal, computing node dis-
joint paths, we pause to point out that realizing it while
preserving BGP’s distributed, policy-based computa-
tions is non-trivial [4]. Fortunately, our path disjoint-
ness constraint can be relaxed to disjointness only in the
2There is no coordination between processes of different col-
ors in different ASes. The red (or blue) process selects path
among those announced by the red (or blue) processes of
neighboring ASes.
“downhill” section. Because of the “valley-free” prop-
erty, and AS path typically consists of an uphill portion
followed by a downhill portion, which consists of a se-
quence of provider-to-customer links, together with the
ASes at the two ends of each link (the other part of the
AS path, if it exists, is the uphill portion). The ability
to relax the node disjointness constraints of paths to
the downhill portion is based on Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2.
Note that we model an AS as a single node in AS
graph and consider eBGP only. Lemma 3.1 states that
route addition and route change events will not trigger
transient problems. This is because no ASes lose routes
after such routing events, so that transient problems can
be altogether avoided. When considering iBGP, some-
one getting a new route can cause others to lose routes,
not to mention the complicated interactions because of
the MED attribute. However, the recently proposed
centralized routing [2,7] get around the iBGP problems.
A complete proof of the Lemma is in [14].
Lemma 3.1. No transient routing loops or failures
occur after route change or route addition events.
Lemma 3.2 considers route withdrawal events that
commonly give rise to transient BGP problems. It es-
tablishes that under the constraints of common routing
policies, network events in the uphill portion of a path
will not trigger transient loops or failures during BGP
convergence. In other words, a link or AS failure in a
higher tier AS (provider) does not create transient fail-
ures or loops at an AS while its BGP process adapts to
the changes. More formally (see again [14] for a proof)
Lemma 3.2. A route withdrawal event in the uphill
portion of an AS path to a destination does not produce
transient routing loops or failures during BGP conver-
gence.
The above two lemmas establish that routes com-
puted by two routing processes and only disjoint in
their downhill portions still offer complementary rout-
ing choices in the face of any routing event. Based on
this insight, we proceed to present the design of our
multi-process routing scheme, the SelecTive Announce-
ment Multi-Process routing protocol (STAMP).
4. THE STAMP PROTOCOL
In this section, we first introduce STAMP and then
formally establish its properties.
4.1 Protocol Overview
In order to realize complementary route selection be-
tween its red and blue processes, the STAMP proto-
col imposes minimal coordination between the two pro-
cesses by way of selective route announcements, i.e., it
constrains the ASes to which red and blue paths are
announced3. Because disjointness is only required in
3Note that this can be readily implemented using standard
the downhill portion, this selectivity only applies to
providers and not to announcements to peers and cus-
tomers, i.e., announcements of both blue and red paths
proceed freely to all peers and customers. The goal is
then to have blue announcements propagate along one
set of providers, and red announcements along a dis-
joint set of providers. The challenge is to realize this in
a distributed manner and with simple rules that can be
easily incorporated into BGP. One option is to give one
color, say, blue, strict priority over the other, so that an
AS preferentially advertises blue routes to its providers
in case it received them on both processes. Such an ap-
proach is, however, overly restrictive and can severely
affect the odds of all ASes successfully acquiring a red
path to all prefixes. In order to minimize the likelihood
of such an outcome without undue complexity, we rely
on two measures.
First, when a multi-homed AS (i.e., an AS with mul-
tiple providers) announces its own prefixes, it selects a
single blue provider, i.e., one to which it announces its
prefixes through its blue process only, with the remain-
ing providers acting as red providers, i.e., they learn
about the AS’ own prefixes only over their red process4.
This initial “coloring” of how an AS advertises its own
prefixes to its providers ensures that each of them can
be reached through red and blue paths associated with
different last hop providers.
Our second measure seeks to ensure the successful
propagation of at least one blue path, while not overly
penalizing the possible propagation of red paths. For
this purpose, we introduce a new BGP path attribute,
Lock, which takes a value of 1 when set, and which is
set by the origin AS when advertising prefixes to the se-
lected blue provider. Subsequent providers that receive
a blue route with the Lock attribute set are required
to propagate it further to one other (provider) AS with
the Lock attribute set, and possibly to other (provider)
ASes but this time without the Lock attribute set. This
guarantees the creation of a blue downhill path to all
prefixes, and given that paths of both colors are always
announced to peers and customers, the availability of a
blue path to that prefix from all ASes. Providers that
receive a blue route with the Lock attribute unset are
not required to propagate it. Furthermore, propagating
red routes to providers (except a locked blue provider
if present) is given precedence over the propagation of
blue routes. This maximizes the odds that red paths
eventually reach all ASes.
4.2 Properties of STAMP
Having described STAMP, we outline why it is safe
BGP mechanisms such as filters, and that all prefixes are
still announced to all provider; only the color of the process
used to announce them varies.
4For a single-homed origin AS, this occurs at its first multi-
homed direct/indirect provider.
and produces complementary paths. Details are again
available in [14].
We first note that the only difference between STAMP
and BGP is that a STAMP routing process selectively
announces routes to providers. Selective announcements
only limit the routes announced in STAMP, when com-
pared to BGP. Hence, each STAMP routing process re-
mains safe as long as BGP itself is safe. When it comes
to the paths generated by STAMP, note that its red
and blue processes never announce their best routes to
the same providers. Hence, if both the red and blue
routing processes of an AS have paths to a prefix, then
the paths must be downhill node disjoint. Based on
Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, this implies that the red and blue
routing processes are complementary which we summa-
rize in Theorem 4.1, whose proof is in [14].
Theorem 4.1. Under one routing event, the red and
blue routing processes in STAMP are complementary.
Theorem 4.1 not withstanding, while in STAMP red
and blue paths to a given prefix are complementary, its
does not ensure that both of them exist. As mentioned
above, a blue path will always exist, albeit not always
as a customer route, but a red path may not. In order
for a red AS path to exists, at least one red path must
successfully propagate to a tier-1 AS (see [14] for a for-
mal proof). In Section 6, we use an AS graph derived
from BGP routing tables to show that given the high
level of connectivity in the current Internet, the odds of
this happening are high (over 92%).
5. USING STAMP ROUTES
Once STAMP has computed routes, their use in for-
warding packets is obviously of importance. This sec-
tion briefly reviews packet forwarding rules without div-
ing into how to implement the forwarding function, e.g.,
using techniques such as packet marking adopted in [12,
16], or virtual interface as proposed in [11]. A virtual
interface based solution is backward compatible with
the current infrastructure but adds complexity, which
is avoided by packet marking that, however, requires
the use of some header bits, e.g., DS bits. Note that
both techniques have certain overheads which are the
cost we have to pay in order to achieve reliable data
forwarding.
5.1 Packet Forwarding
A first assumption is that the source AS (or the first
AS with that capability) assigns an initial “color” to
packets it originates. A transit AS can then receive
packets from either color5 for a given destination, but
must, whenever possible, forward packets of a given
color using routes of the same color. The exception
to this rule is when the intended route is experiencing
5Note that if an AS only has a blue route to a destination,
it will never receive a red packet for that destination since
it never announced a red route to its neighbors.
instabilities (more on this below), in which case the AS
changes the packet color and forwards it using the route
of the other color. Such a change can, however, only be
performed once for each packet to avoid loops [12].
5.2 Detecting and Avoiding Route Instabilities
Recall that our goal is to always select a routing pro-
cess whose paths are not affected by transient prob-
lems. Realizing this goal involves addressing two issues:
(1) detecting problematic behavior in routing processes,
(2) identifying which routing process is free of transient
problems. According to Lemma 3.1 and 3.2, problems
arise only when a routing process loses routes (with-
drawals). Whether the trigger for a route events is a
withdrawal is known to the AS adjacent to where the
failure (or policy change) took place, but not necessarily
to ASes further away. In order to preserve the knowl-
edge of what originally triggered a routing event, we
add a new path attribute ET (Event Type) to BGP
update messages (this is our second “minor” modifica-
tion to BGP). The ET attribute is 1-bit of information
that indicates whether the update was caused by losing
a route (ET=0) or not (ET=1). A detailed discussion
on how to set ET can be found in [14].
The ET attribute is then used as follows to deter-
mine which route can be used: If an AS is using a best
route computed by one process and that process loses
the route (receives an update message with ET=0 or
the adjacent link/node fails), the AS switches to the
route selected by the other process. If both processes
receive update messages with ET=0, either process that
still has a route can be used.
Theorem 5.1, whose proof can again be found in [14],
formally establishes that this achieves reliable packet
forwarding in the presence of any single routing event.
Note that we assume each router is equipped with the
functions such as forwarding according the “color” of
the packet, detecting potential transient routing prob-
lems, and changing the “color” of the packet.
Theorem 5.1. In case of any single routing events,
STAMP ensures that no packet will be looped or black-
holed once the ASes adjacent to where the routing event
occured have detected the event.
6. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Given that STAMP may not always succeed in dis-
covering blue and red paths at all ASes even when they
exist, we first evaluate STAMP’s performance along
that dimension. Next, we compare STAMP with other
schemes under various failure scenarios by simulations.
In order to carry out meaningful and realistic evalua-
tions, we conduct our experiments using an AS Internet
topology derived from BGP routing tables collected by
the RouteViews project. The underlying AS relation-
ships are inferred using Gao’s algorithm [5].
6.1 Realizing Disjoint Paths
Can STAMP ensure that all ASes have both blue and
red paths to a destination? This depends on the AS
topology as well as on how the ASes select their locked
blue provider. We initially assume that the locked blue
provider is selected randomly among all providers of
an AS. Given the AS topology, we can then compute
the odds that ASes have both blue and red paths to a
destination. Let Φm be the probability that all ASes
have both red and blue routes to multi-homed AS m,
and denote λ as the number of all possible paths fromm
to any tier-1 AS. If path li, 1 ≤ i ≤ λ, is selected as the
“locked blue path” from m to a tier-1 AS and a disjoint
path fromm to another tier-1 AS exists, we say that li is
a “good” locked blue path since we know that STAMP
will then be able to find a red path. If there are λ
′
good
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Figure 1: The CDF of Φk.
In Figure 1, we plot the CDF (Cumulative Distribu-
tion Function) of Φk for all destinations. We see that
less than 10% of destinations have Φk ≤ 0.7. Con-
versely, more than 75% of destination ASes have a prob-
ability greater than 0.9 that all other ASes can reach
them through both red and blue paths. On average, all
ASes have both red and blue paths to any destination
AS with probability 0.92.
An intuitive option to improve the odds of STAMP
constructing both red and blue paths, is to let the source
AS “intelligently” select its locked blue provider rather
than select it randomly as other ASes do. This can be
realized with minimal information, and we show in [14]
that this can increase the percentage of ASes with red
and blue paths to all destinations from 92% to 97%.
6.2 Performance Under Failure – Comparison
to Other Schemes
The previous experiments focused on evaluating the
ability of STAMP to provide protections again any sin-
gle routing event, which does not account for the actual
impact of each possible failure scenario, e.g., some fail-
ures may not have an impact even for ASes for which
STAMP did not succeed in identifying both red and
blue paths. In order to better assess STAMP’s actual
benefits in the presence of failures, we developed an
event-driven simulator to replicate routing dynamics.
We implemented BGP, R-BGP, and STAMP in the sim-
ulator. For all protocols, both processing and transmis-
sion delays are modeled as a random variable uniformly
distributed in [10ms, 20ms]. The BGP MRAI timer is
peer-based and set to 30 seconds multiplied by a ran-
dom factor uniformly distributed within [0.75, 1.0].
6.2.1 Single link failure
We simulate routing convergence after a multi-homed
AS fails one of its provider links. The destination AS is
randomly selected across 100 simulation instances. The
average (across all 100 scenarios) number of ASes hav-
ing transient problems is shown in Figure 2. BGP has
more than 6,000 ASes experiencing transient problems.
Although R-BGP handles single link failure very well,
it requires RCI mechanism, which adds significant com-
plexity to the routing system. Nevertheless, we include
it as a benchmark against which to compare STAMP.
Note that without RCI, R-BGP results in over 2,000
ASes being affected in some ways by failures. STAMP
has about 350 ASes that experience transient problems.
Considering that the actual Internet is likely to be more
densely connected than the partial AS topology we de-



























Figure 2: Number of ASes with transient prob-
lems under single link failure.
6.2.2 Multiple link failures
Next, we consider scenarios where multiple links fail
simultaneously (or policy changes affect multiple ASes).
We distinguish between two cases: i) the two failed links
are not connected to the same AS; and ii) the two failed
links are connected to the same AS. In the first case, an
origin AS fails one of its provider links and another ran-
domly selected indirect provider link (multi-hop away
from the origin AS). In the second case, an origin AS
fails a link to one of its providers and that provider also
fails one of its own provider links.
The average number of ASes experiencing transient
problems are presented in Figure 3. When the two failed
links are not connected to the same AS, both STAMP
and R-BGP perform similarly, while when the two failed
links are connected to the same AS, STAMP experi-
ences about half fewer problems than R-BGP. This is
because multiple link failures at the same AS corre-
spond to a “single” routing event for STAMP; some-
thing against which its node-disjoint path selection of-
fers protection. A similar set of conclusions hold in the
presence of single node (AS) failures, which correspond



















































(b) two failed links connect to the same AS
Figure 3: Number of ASes with transient prob-
lems under multiple link failures.
Note that when R-BGP is not afforded the benefit of
RCI, its performance again degrades significantly.
6.3 Additional Experiments
We also conducted experiments to evaluate STAMP
in terms of partial deployment, convergence delay, and
protocol message overhead. Because of space limit,
we only briefly review the results here and refer again
to [14] for further details.
In terms of partial deployment, we focused on a sce-
nario where STAMP is deployed only at tier-1 ASes,
and found that this would result in about 75% of all
ASes having two downhill node disjoint paths to any
destination. In terms of protocol overhead, STAMP
using two parallel routing processes generate less than
twice the number of updates as one standard BGP pro-
cess. If STAMP is implemented as one process handling
two instances, we expect the number of updates to be
similar to that of BGP. Finally, when it comes to con-
vergence delay, we found that in spite of the possibility
of back-tracking caused by its selective announcement
rules, STAMP actually converges faster than standard
BGP in response to the same routing event.
7. CONCLUSION
The paper proposed a multi-process routing solution,
STAMP, which seeks to mitigate the occurrence of tran-
sient problems (loops and black-holes) in today’s inter-
domain routing. Given the wealth of operational knowl-
edge embedded in BGP and the many benefits of its
flexibility, STAMP sought to realize this goal with min-
imal changes to BGP (it requires two new simple at-
tributes and coordination between its two processes that
can be realized using existing BGP mechanism, e.g., se-
lective path announcements). STAMP computes two
complementary AS paths, which we show can be ac-
complished by focusing only on the downhill portion
of AS paths, and using a simple heuristic for path se-
lection. STAMP was evaluated through extensive ex-
periments, which demonstrated its benefits in terms of
greater routing stability compared to BGP. These im-
provements were comparable, and for some important
failure scenarios, better than those of previous propos-
als that also called for more extensive and potentially
complex modifications to BGP, e.g., in the form of RCI.
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